254 lines
5.7 KiB
C
254 lines
5.7 KiB
C
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/*****************************************************************************
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*
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* $Id: env.c,v 1.3 2005/08/30 17:53:35 mbse Exp $
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* Purpose ...............: MBSE BBS Shadow Password Suite
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* Original Source .......: Shadow Password Suite
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* Original Copyright ....: Julianne Frances Haugh and others.
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*
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*****************************************************************************
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* Copyright (C) 1997-2005
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*
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* Michiel Broek FIDO: 2:280/2802
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* Beekmansbos 10
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* 1971 BV IJmuiden
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* the Netherlands
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*
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* This file is part of MBSE BBS.
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*
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* This BBS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
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* Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any
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* later version.
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*
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* MBSE BBS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
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* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with MBSE BBS; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the Free
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* Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
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*****************************************************************************/
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#include "../config.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "mblogin.h"
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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/*
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* NEWENVP_STEP must be a power of two. This is the number
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* of (char *) pointers to allocate at a time, to avoid using
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* realloc() too often.
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*/
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#define NEWENVP_STEP 16
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size_t newenvc = 0;
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char **newenvp = NULL;
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extern char **environ;
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static const char *forbid[] = {
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"_RLD_=",
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"BASH_ENV=", /* GNU creeping featurism strikes again... */
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"ENV=",
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"HOME=",
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"IFS=",
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"KRB_CONF=",
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"LD_", /* anything with the LD_ prefix */
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"LIBPATH=",
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"MAIL=",
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"NLSPATH=",
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"PATH=",
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"SHELL=",
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"SHLIB_PATH=",
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(char *) 0
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};
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/* these are allowed, but with no slashes inside
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(to work around security problems in GNU gettext) */
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static const char *noslash[] = {
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"LANG=",
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"LANGUAGE=",
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"LC_", /* anything with the LC_ prefix */
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(char *) 0
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};
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/*
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* initenv() must be called once before using addenv().
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*/
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void initenv(void)
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{
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newenvp = (char **)xmalloc(NEWENVP_STEP * sizeof(char *));
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*newenvp = NULL;
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}
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void addenv(const char *string, const char *value)
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{
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char *cp, *newstring;
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size_t i;
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size_t n;
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if (value) {
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newstring = xmalloc(strlen(string) + strlen(value) + 2);
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snprintf(newstring, strlen(string) + strlen(value) + 2, "%s=%s", string, value);
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} else {
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newstring = xstrdup(string);
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}
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/*
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* Search for a '=' character within the string and if none is found
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* just ignore the whole string.
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*/
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cp = strchr(newstring, '=');
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if (!cp) {
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free(newstring);
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return;
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}
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n = (size_t)(cp - newstring);
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for (i = 0; i < newenvc; i++) {
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if (strncmp(newstring, newenvp[i], n) == 0 &&
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(newenvp[i][n] == '=' || newenvp[i][n] == '\0'))
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break;
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}
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if (i < newenvc) {
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free(newenvp[i]);
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newenvp[i] = newstring;
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return;
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}
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newenvp[newenvc++] = newstring;
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/*
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* Check whether newenvc is a multiple of NEWENVP_STEP.
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* If so we have to resize the vector.
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* the expression (newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0
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* is equal to (newenvc % NEWENVP_STEP) == 0
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* as long as NEWENVP_STEP is a power of 2.
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*/
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if ((newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0) {
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char **__newenvp;
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size_t newsize;
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/*
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* If the resize operation succeds we can
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* happily go on, else print a message.
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*/
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newsize = (newenvc + NEWENVP_STEP) * sizeof(char *);
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__newenvp = (char **)realloc(newenvp, newsize);
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if (__newenvp) {
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/*
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* If this is our current environment, update
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* environ so that it doesn't point to some
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* free memory area (realloc() could move it).
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*/
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if (environ == newenvp)
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environ = __newenvp;
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newenvp = __newenvp;
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, "Environment overflow\n");
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free(newenvp[--newenvc]);
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}
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}
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/*
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* The last entry of newenvp must be NULL
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*/
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newenvp[newenvc] = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* set_env - copy command line arguments into the environment
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*/
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void set_env(int argc, char * const *argv)
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{
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int noname = 1;
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char variable[1024];
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char *cp;
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for ( ; argc > 0; argc--, argv++) {
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if (strlen(*argv) >= sizeof variable)
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continue; /* ignore long entries */
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if (! (cp = strchr (*argv, '='))) {
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snprintf(variable, sizeof variable, "L%d", noname++);
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addenv(variable, *argv);
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} else {
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const char **p;
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for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
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if (strncmp(*argv, *p, strlen(*p)) == 0)
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break;
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if (*p) {
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strncpy(variable, *argv, cp - *argv);
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variable[cp - *argv] = '\0';
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printf("You may not change $%s\n", variable);
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continue;
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}
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addenv(*argv, NULL);
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* sanitize_env - remove some nasty environment variables
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* If you fall into a total paranoia, you should call this
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* function for any root-setuid program or anything the user
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* might change the environment with. 99% useless as almost
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* all modern Unixes will handle setuid executables properly,
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* but... I feel better with that silly precaution. -j.
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*/
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void sanitize_env(void)
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{
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char **envp = environ;
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const char **bad;
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char **cur;
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char **move;
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for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
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for (bad = forbid; *bad; bad++) {
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if (strncmp(*cur, *bad, strlen(*bad)) == 0) {
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for (move = cur; *move; move++)
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*move = *(move + 1);
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cur--;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
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for (bad = noslash; *bad; bad++) {
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if (strncmp(*cur, *bad, strlen(*bad)) != 0)
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continue;
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if (!strchr(*cur, '/'))
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continue; /* OK */
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for (move = cur; *move; move++)
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*move = *(move + 1);
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cur--;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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